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ABSTRACT  
The current application of Positive Performance Indicators (PPIs) in the construction industry 
largely measures numbers of disparate safety activities.  Generally, PPIs are seen by industry 
stakeholders as not providing generalizable indicators of safety effectiveness.  Further, they 
do not provide consistent data useable by industry to target areas of focus and improvement 
in safety performance.  Notwithstanding efforts by NOHSC since 1994 to encourage the 
uptake of PPIs, industry at large has rejected these attempts.  Yet, currently PPIs are the only 
‘lead’ indicators measuring success as opposed to ‘lag’ indicators which, increasingly, since 
the mid 90s have been criticized as largely measuring failure eg, the raw number of injuries 
sustained in an organization per year or their frequency obtained by dividing the number of 
injuries by (a notional) one million hours worked per annum (Lost Time Injury Frequency 
Rates) (LTIFRs).  Another issue that militates against the uptake of PPIs is that for legislative 
purposes, such as recording and reporting injuries, only LTIs and the like are required under 
the nine Australian OHS jurisdictions.  Generally their format is guided by Australian Standard 
AS 1885.1-1990, which is non-enforceable at law, but nationally and internationally 
recognized as an authoritative conformance document.  There is no equivalent for PPIs.  
Another inadequacy common to lead and lag indicators is that neither measure essential 
leadership attributes, communications and desired safe behaviours as necessary elements of 
safety culture and safety performance.  The Construction Innovation CRC research project on 
which this paper is based proposes that the measurement of safety effectiveness is a 
requirement for measuring safe behaviours and safety performance.  In other words, as well 
as requiring positive safety behaviours, these need to be measured according to the positive 
safety actions they generate.  Currently, there are no standard national or international safety 
effectiveness indicators (SEIs) that are accepted by the construction industry (nor any other 
industry).  The purpose of this research is to explore the applicability of SEIs to the 
construction industry.  
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1.0 SAFETY EFFECTIVENESS INDICATORS (SEIs):  MEASURING 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY SAFETY PERFORMANCE.  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This paper investigates the potential of the development and applicability of measuring 
safety performance in the Australian construction industry based on a newly proposed ‘tool’, 
Safety Effectiveness Indicators (SEIs).  Its development emanates from a recently 
commenced research project funded by the CRC for Construction Innovation in partnership 
with Leighton Contractors, John Holland Group, Thiess Contractors and the Office of the 
Federal Safety Commissioner (OFSC).  Construction industry workers’ compensation 
premiums are generally the highest in each of the state and territory jurisdictions of Australia.  
Nationally the construction industry has far more injuries and ill-health than the Australian 
average, and pays one of the highest workers’ compensation premium rates in Australia.  
Yet, other than lost time injuries (LTIs) or similar ‘negative’ ‘lag’ performance indicators, 
reliable, comparable and standardised performance indicators are not available.  An 
evaluation below of Positive Performance Indicators (PPIs) as an OHS performance 
measuring tool, based on a brief overview of its limited uptake in Australian industry, 
suggests that it does not reliably measure OHS performance.  Similarly, other ‘positive’ or 
‘lead’ indicators, which owing to word length limitations are not discussed in this paper, have 
parallel shortcomings.  However, based on current workers’ compensation claims and 
incidence of injury and illness there is a clearly demonstrable need to measure safety 
performance on construction sites in order to improve industry performance.  Likewise, in the 
post construction facility management phase of completed projects there is a need for 
reliable safety performance measurement.  In part, these issues of safety performance 
measurability were addressed by Biggs, Sheahan, Dingsdag and Cipolla (2006), who while 
conducting research for A Construction Safety Competency Framework (Dingsdag, Biggs, 
Sheahan and Cipolla, 2006 a; 2006 b), devised a matrix of safety cultural competencies 
determined by identified safe behaviours and safety management tasks (SMTs) for the 
Australian construction industry.   
 
The research objectives for the current research project are to examine how safety cu ltural 
competencies and their associated safe behaviours, as well as leadership attributes and 
effective communication can be assessed predicated on whether or not they have a 
measurable impact on safety performance.  It is suggested that, based on their current 
application in the construction industry, PPIs do not have the capacity to actually measure 
safety performance although some do recognise, safe behaviours, leadership and 
communication as measurable characteristics of safety culture.  Rather, as discussed below, 
PPIs tend to measure OHS processes, but not safety performance per se.  In Australia the 
unproductiveness of PPIs gradually became clear to industry, including the construction 
industry, after 1994 when the then National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
(NOHSC) (also known alternatively as WorkSafe Australia) held two initial workshops to 
determine the viability of PPIs as an alternative to measuring OHS performance based on 
lag, or so – called negative indicators, such as LTIs.  The difficulty of the measurability of 
safety performance by most known existing performance indicators is a recurring theme for 
this paper and the broader research framework of the current project.  Arguably one of  the 
most practical guiding principles of the measurability of safety performance is given in the 
Australian/ New Zealand Standard, AS/NZS 4804: 2001 Occupational health and safety 
management systems—General guidelines on principles, systems and supporting 
techniques (AS/NZS 4804) which defines safety performance as, 
 
    the measurable results of the occupational health and safety management system 
related to the organisation’s control of health and safety risks, based on its OHS 
policy, objectives and targets.  Performance measurement includes measurement of 
OHS management activities and results. 
 
Perhaps ultimately, the most informative, yet simple, guidance for the efficacy of any 
performance indicator emanates from the UK HSE which prefaces one of the key sections of 
A Guide to Measuring Safety Performance by asking ‘Why measure performance?’ (HSE, 
2001, p. 6).  This simple question is possibly best responded to by Peter Drucker’ s often 
quoted, maxim, ‘You can't manage what you can't measure,’ which may seem trite, yet its 
straightforward exhortation seems to contain invaluable advice when attempting to measure 
safety performance effectively.   
 
1.2 PPIs AND THEIR IMPACT ON SAFETY PERFORMANCE  
 
During the currency of the research project that produced A Construction Safety 
Competency Framework, aside from identifying essential leadership attributes, 
communication and desired safe behaviours as necessary elements of safety culture, 
Dingsdag, Biggs, Sheahan and Cipolla (2006a) identified the measurement of safety 
effectiveness as a requirement for measuring the influence of these elements of safety 
culture on safety performance.  However, aside from positing that these have a positive 
influence on safety performance there is little validated evidence that the positive safety 
actions they generate actually influence safety performance positively.  Other than anecdotal 
evidence from industry that safety culture impacts positively on safety performance and a 
plethora of academic literature that enthusiastically supports the implementation of safety 
culture, its benefits are largely predicated on an article of faith:  It is not unusual to hear 
experienced OHS professionals claim that they know it works, but that their claims are based 
on intuition, not on measurable criteria.  Further, currently, there are no standard national or 
international PPIs or any other lead indicators measuring safety culture or safety 
performance that are accepted by the construction industry (nor any other industry) 
notwithstanding that the application of PPIs was enthusiastically advocated in 1994 by the 
then WorkSafe/ NOHSC at a national symposium attended by all industry sectors’ 
representatives (vide for example Shaw, 1994, pp. 15-27).  A series of subsequent 
workshops and papers commissioned by NOHSC resulted in a consensus that, based on an 
industry wide framework, individual organisations should develop PPIs to achieve improved 
OHS performance.  Unfortunately no guidance was established relative to the development, 
application and valid measurement of PPIs.  Significantly for this research, even though 
safety culture change was identified during the symposium, the use of safe behaviours as 
performance indicators was considered, but not developed sufficiently.  Essentially, the 
identified positive performance indicators were mainly (but not exclusively) linked to non-
behavioural processes and typically measured numbers of OHS oriented activities and did 
not provide an indication of these activities’ measurability.  For example, these included;  
 
· effectiveness of training programs; 
· effectiveness of OHS structures; 
· effectiveness of OHS representatives; and 
· return to work rate (Sweeney, 1994, p. 39).  
This endorsement of the development of PPIs was a reaction to the perceived inability of 
traditional ‘outcome’ safety performance indicators, LTIs or lag indicators to measure 
success:  They were condemned as negative, largely measuring failure; eg, for Lost Time 
Injury Frequency Rates (LTIFRs), the raw number of injuries sustained in an organisation 
per year and their frequency obtained by dividing the number of injuries by (a notional) one 
million hours worked per annum.  Conversely, the capacity of PPIs to show improvement in 
safety performance, rather than negative outcomes, was explored at length, and their 
implementation was strongly endorsed.  The process of what PPIs should measure and how 
to devise standardized PPIs was also fully discussed eventually to the detriment of their 
implementation.  Andrea Shaw, one of the NOHSC 1994 symposium’s facilitators suggested 
that PPIs may not be sufficiently precise.  Further, concerns were raised that PPIs may not 
be able to be generalized because there was no standardized application of PPIs (vide 
passim, Blewett, 1994 and Shaw, 1994).  Briefly, common limitations of PPIs identified were 
that PPIs: 
· may not directly reflect actual success in preventing injury and/ or disease 
· may not be easily measured 
· may be difficult to compare for benchmarking or comparative purposes 
· may be time-consuming to collect and collate 
· may be subject to random variation 
· may encourage under or over reporting depending on how they are measured; 
and; 
· that the relationship between PPIs and LTIs was arbitrary 
· only measure the number of events and do not provide any indication or measure 
of effectiveness of each measured event 
It is the last limitation that has particular relevance for the issues raised in this paper.  
Another issue that militated against the uptake of PPIs was that for legislative purposes, 
such as recording and reporting injuries, mainly LTIs and the like are required under the nine 
disparate Australian OHS jurisdictions.  Generally their format was and is guided by 
Australian Standard AS 1885.1-1990, known as the National Standard for workplace injury 
and disease recording, which is non-enforceable at law, but nationally and internationally 
recognized as an authoritative conformance document.  Other than a cursory mention of 
PPIs in AS/NZS 4804 there is no equivalent Standard for PPIs.  The application of PPIs is 
and was strongly denounced in the performance measurement literature, most notably by Dr 
Edward Emmett, Chief Executive, WorkSafe Australia (1994) who officiated at the 1994 
symposium.  Conversely, the robust denunciation of lag indicators at the same symposium 
still has strong currency in the construction industry notwithstanding that no reliable, 
comparable and standardised lead performance indicators have emerged. 
In 1999 NOHSC issued an extensive report on the development of PPIs for the construction 
industry entitled OHS Performance Measurement in the Construction Industry.  Based on 
several industry case studies a tri-partite working group of industry, government and the 
union movement examined the possibility of implementing PPIs to measure safety 
performance in the construction industry.  As with its 1994 strategy, NOHSC sought to 
develop a set of broad (and vague) PPIs that measured performance across the industry.  
Based on case studies of the various construction industry sectors the following PPIs were 
found to be commonly used: 
§ number of JSAs conducted; 
§ number of hazard inspections conducted; 
§ number of tool box talks conducted; 
§ number of OHS inductions conducted; 
§ number of OHS meetings completed; 
§ number of OHS training exercises held; 
§ number of OHS audits conducted; 
§ number of OHS bulletins issued; 
§ number of OHS non-compliance reports issued; 
§ whether OHS procedures for critical works have been submitted by 
subcontractors (rated either yes or no); 
§ whether there is evidence that surveillance of sub-contractors is carried out (rated 
either yes or no); 
§ the frequency of on-site inspections; 
§ the time taken to fix problems in accordance with the allocated time frame; 
§ general attitude to safety on site (subjectively assessed by the OHS coordinator); 
§ quality of records and documents related to OHS (subjectively assessed by the 
OHS coordinator); 
§ commitment to safety overall (subjectively assessed by the OHS coordinator); 
§ the consistency of project managers in relation to OHS as a measure of the 
quality of OHS management in contractors (used informally and subjectively 
assessed by the OHS coordinator); 
§ workers’ rating of supervisors/project management’s commitment to OHS 
§ percentage of injuries incurred for major hazards; 
§ percentage of sub-standard conditions identified and corrected as a result of 
safety audits; 
§ results of independent (by people in the same company, but from different sites) 
and external audits.  Measured as number, regularity, quality, outcomes and 
action taken to resolve non-conformances; 
§ time taken to get hazards under control once they have been identified; 
§ assessment of the availability and standard of PPE; and 
§ number of hazard reports and feedback from toolbox meetings. (NOHSC, 1999, 
pp. 44, 45). 
 
As well as suffering the common limitations of PPIs identified at the 1994 NOHSC 
workshops/ symposium, it is readily observable that those PPIs that merely measure a 
number of activities without follow up (‘close out’) actions, do not directly impact on safety 
performance.  In fact, anecdotal evidence from the industry suggests that in some instances 
other than collecting and collating these indicators no follow up action may have occurred.  
Hence it’s entirely possible that there was no impact on safety performance at all, let alone 
that they may, ‘…only measure the number of events and do not provide any indication or 
measure of effectiveness of each measured event (Blewett, 1994 and Shaw, 1994).’ 
The success of such an approach is further negated by the fragmented nature of the 
Australian construction industry which in the private sector consists of fewer than 30 very 
large principal contractor organizations and a similar number of ‘second tier’ large principal 
contractors.  Typically these organizations rely on a substantial component of large 
contractors employing up to 100 employees who in turn employ subcontractors which may 
consist of two or three to less than 20 employees.  It is also common to engage 
subcontractors who are the proprietor/ only employee.  In this manner the construction 
industry employs approximately 900,000 people.  Further, projects may last from a few 
months to a few years after which the project team moves on to another project and the 
safety culture and its safety performance dissipates.  In addition, the industry is further 
fragmented, by the nature of the work undertaken, which includes the erection of commercial 
and residential high rise buildings, the cottage industry, building refurbishment and 
maintenance, facility management, road and bridge work, tunneling, rail infrastructure, 
energy infrastructure including electricity transmission lines, pipelines of various types as 
well as the development of open-cut mines.  Quite clearly, the industry is not uniform in 
terms of the work performed and organizational size, and hence organizational resources:  
In addition, each part of construction work has its own particularized context relative to OHS 
risk, safety performance and performance measurement.  Consequently there is broad 
agreement in the performance indicator and measurement literature that indicators should 
be based on the particular OHS risk exposure, the related safety performance and individual 
organizations’ resource capability, specific industry position, the maturity of organizations’ 
OHS and human resource (HRM) systems and that they should be based on the types of 
work and projects undertaken.  Yet, in order to improve the industry’s safety performance, 
other than the universally accepted lag indicators industry standardized lead performance 
indicators must be developed.  In 2002 NOHSC held another workshop whose Report also 
reflects the lack of standardized construction industry PPIs and the difficulty of their 
measurement (NOHSC, 2002). 
As a result of NOHSC’s encouragement and support of the development of PPIs their 
adaption was taken up by other influential organizations, notably, Standards Australia, 
which, as noted above, advocated the use of performance measurement based on PPIs in 
AS/NZS 4804, but provided no framework for their implementation; WorkSafe Victoria in its 
SafetyMap audit ‘tool’ (1999) and the Minerals Council of Australia, in its Positive 
Performance Measures; a Practical Guide (2001).  Notwithstanding, there is a paucity of 
research which on an evidence based examination supports the application of PPIs and 
performance measurement (vide for example NOHSC 2002), p.3, passim). 
1.3 MEASURING SAFETY CULTURE  
 
Relative to the measurability of safety culture Choudhry et al (2007, p. 1000) make the 
observation that, 
 
Traditionally, organizational culture is measured through the application of qualitative 
methods, such as observations and interviews.  Nevertheless, the three main 
dimensions (psychological, situational and behavioral) can be measured through a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (Cooper, 2000).  The situational 
aspects of safety culture can be seen in the structure of the organization; policies, 
working procedures, management systems, etc.  The behavioral aspects of safety 
culture can be measured through peer observations, self-reporting and outcome 
measures.  The identified safe behaviors are placed on observational checklists, and 
trained observers regularly take observations which are then translated into 
‘percentage of safe scores’ to provide feedback to those being observed.  The 
psychological dimension is most commonly examined by safety climate 
questionnaires devised to measure people’s perceptions of safety.  
 
However, the examples of the models they claim do measure the essential elements of 
safety culture are all human resource intensive and some may also be capital intensive:  For 
example Kennedy and Kirwan (1998) listed in Table 2,  
 
   developed the Safety Culture and Operability (SCHAZOP) approach that focuses 
on the many aspects of safety management practices.  It deals with day-to-day 
activities, including safety management, real roles and the personnel fulfilling these 
roles.  One drawback of the SCHAZOP approach is that it is very resource 
intensive…(Choudhry et al, 2007, p. 1001). 
 
Similarly, according to Choudhry et al;  
 
Cox and Cheyne (2000) incorporated behavioral indicators in their “Safety 
Assessment Toolkit” along with climate questionnaire and semi-structured interview 
schedule.  Cox et al. (2004) conclude that behavioral safety is effective in increasing 
employees’ confidence to challenge unsafe practices, as well as highlighting 
examples of best practice.  Behavioral safety process (BSP) supports cultural 
realignment towards a “safety first” culture.  They indicate that the BSP is an effective 
motivational tool that assists in both individual behavior and attitude change.  
Although measurement of safety culture depends on how it is defined (which in turn 
reflects the adopted perspective), ethnographic approaches are often costly and time 
consuming.  Additionally, they tend to produce discovery data rather than hard data 
that can be incorporated into a management action plan (Choudhry et al, 2007, p 
1001).   
 
In other words, BSP is effective, but resource intensive and it may well be that, similar to 
PPIs, they may produce ‘discovery data’, or what was characterised above as mainly 
measuring process rather than ‘hard data’ which were defined as actions above.  Further, 
the misgivings about the usefulness of the data produced by Choudhry et al align with the 
concerns expressed above about the capacity of PPIs to influence safety performance 
significantly if at all.   
 
1.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEIS  
As a consequence of the vagueness and broadness of PPIs and their measurement, what is 
undertaken for this research is the investigation of the development of a guidance framework 
for performance measurement that can be applied by individual organizations based on an 
industry standardized set of performance indicators suited to their particular organizational 
objectives and environment.  At this stage of the research process we propose to develop a 
mechanism which may incorporate lead indicators that have demonstrated capacity to 
measure their impact on safety performance and combine those with measures of safe 
behaviours and safety cultural competencies.  Simply stated, this research project seeks to 
create a mechanism to standardize and customize the measurement of safety effectiveness 
with valid and user-friendly industry supported indicators that measure the effectiveness of 
specific proactive safety activities each company undertakes.   
Even though since the 1994 NOHSC symposium and workshops lag indicators have been 
repeatedly denounced in some academic literature and government reports (e.g., NOHSC, 
1999) as being negative and reactive and by some academics (e.g. Hopkins, 1994) and 
practitioners as merely measuring failure, it may well be that LTIs, LTIFRs and a raft of other 
lag indicators give the most accurate measurement of performance or, in some instances, 
the lack of performance (see Table 1, Table of suggested lag indicators, below).  At this 
stage of the current research project it is envisaged to examine a range of lag indicators as 
dependent variables with proposed lead indicators (which have not yet been definitively 
identified) as independent variables.  The proposed methodology, based on a range of 
suggested lag indicators and lead indicators will be industry trialled and modified according 
to industry feedback.  
 
Table 1          Table of suggested lag indicators 
Acronym Rates 
FAIFR  (first aid injury frequency rate) 
FIFR  (fatality incidence frequency rate) 
LTIFR  (lost time injury frequency rate) 
MTIR  (medically treated injury rate) 
NMTIR  (non-medically treated injury rate) 
NDOR (notifiable dangerous occurrence rate) 
NII  (non injury incident) or near miss/ near hit 
RTWR  (return to work rate) 
WCCR  (workers’ compensation claim rate) 
WCPR (workers’ compensation premium rate)  
Data from the two year national research project (mentioned above) that investigated the 
motivators of safety culture and safety behaviours in the construction industry has provided a 
data base (Dingsdag, Biggs, Sheahan, Cipolla 2006b) which identifies measurable safety 
behaviours informing the future formulation of SEIs.  Based on approximately 70 interviews 
with managing directors, other senior management, construction site managers, union 
officials and semi-structured focus groups consisting of line management of Australia’s 
eleven largest principal contractors Dingsdag, Biggs, Sheahan and Cipolla (2006b) have 
identified 39 safety management tasks that are considered critical to enhancing safety 
performance by the industry.  Two survey instruments consisting of a management and 
worker questionnaire were administered nationally to the participating construction 
companies.  All of the findings were validated through interviews with senior officials of the 
ACTU, the principal construction sector union, the CFMEU, and senior managers of each of 
the OHS regulators in every State and Territory.  After the qualitative and quantitative data 
were collated and analysed the results were taken back to each participating organisation for 
comment, suggestions for change and or validation.  To create SEIs was outside the scope 
of the research project, but the standardised measurement of safety actions and associated 
safety behaviours is seen by industry as a necessary complement to the 39 SMTs.  Further, 
notwithstanding the above opinion that other than anecdotal evidence from industry that 
safety culture impacts positively on safety performance, the research project’s investigation 
of the motivators of safety culture and safety behaviours in the construction industry data 
suggested that measurable safety behaviours had the capacity to formulate SEIs (Dingsdag, 
Biggs, Sheahan, Cipolla 2006).   
Other recently conducted research notably Choudhry, Fang and Mohamed, (2007) strongly 
endorse the measurability of safety culture elements.  Further, this important article provided 
a useful (but incomplete) typology of the major safety culture/ safety climate methodologies 
(Table 2 below) of the principle of which some of the entries also incorporate suggested 
methods of measuring safety culture actions.  
 
Table 2 List and summary of prior safety culture research 
Reference  Summary of Research 
Thompson et al. 
(1998)  
Presents a model that links management support, organizational climate, and self-
reported safety outcomes such as safety condition/safety compliance. 
Kennedy and 
Kirwan (1998) 
 
Focuses on aspects of safety management practices called the Safety Culture 
Hazard and Operability (SCHAZOP), and provides a qualitative analytical approach 
to identify detailed vulnerabilities and the means for their prevention. 
HSE (1999) 
 
Produces and utilizes a Health and Safety Climate Survey Tool that helps 
establishing what employees think of their organization’s health and safety issues, 
and provides a basis on which to improve health and safety, involving employees in 
the process. 
Hale (2000)  
 
Elaborates on the complex aspects of safety culture, and suggests the elements of a 
good safety culture. 
Pidgeon and 
O’Leary (2000)  
 
Refers to the pioneering work of Barry Turner whose book Man-made Disasters 
(Turner, 1978) was one of the first to draw attention to the organization processes 
needed for learning from past incidents and mistakes, in order to achieve a good 
safety culture. 
Rundmo (2000)  
 
Presents mental images of risk and the results of a survey addressing issues such 
as safety climate, employee attitudes, risk perception and behavior among 
employees within an industrial company Norsk Hydro.  The presented model links 
safety climate factors to actions related to the control of risk. 
Lee and Harrison 
(2000)  
 
Addresses attitudes, perceptions and reported behaviors.  It provides reliable 
measurement scales and examines the issues of culture difference, not only 
between organizations as well as sub-populations within a single organisation. 
Neal et al. (2000)  Presents a model that links organizational climate to safety climate.  The model 
demonstrates that organizational climate predicts safety climate, which in turn is 
related to safety performance. 
Cox and Cheyne 
(2000)  
Describes the development of two elements of a toolkit, which combines audits with 
questionnaires assessing employees’ perceptions and attitudes. 
Grote and Kunzler 
(2000)  
Presents a socio-technical model of safety culture and then shows that attitudes and 
perception surveys produce parallel results to auditing. 
McDonald et al. 
(2000)  
Explores the relationships of different aspects of safety culture and safety 
management systems and presents a revised model of safety management systems. 
Glendon and 
Stanton (2000)  
Presents the useful distinction between strategic top–down, functionalist perspective 
and data-driven bottom-up, interpretive approaches to safety culture. 
Guldenmund 
(2000)  
Postulates safety as the central object of organizational culture and presents an 
excellent review of 15 studies indicating the complexity of the safety climate concept 
Clarke (2000)  
 
Clarifies the term safety culture, and proposes a theoretical model by which safety 
culture affects safety behaviors in organisations. 
Cooper (2000)  
 
Presents a reciprocal model of safety culture to understand its dynamic, multi-
faceted and holistic nature. 
Glendon and 
Litherland (2001) 
Presents the factor structure of safety climate and develops a behavioral observation 
measure of safety performance.  However, it fails to find any relationship between 
safety climate and the behavioral observation measure of safety performance. 
Mearns et al. 
(2001)  
 
Reveals benchmarking strategies for monitoring safety climate and presents the 
relative weaknesses and strengths of organizations’ safety-climate profiles in a 
readily accessible format. 
Neal and Griffin 
(2002)  
 
Presents a model identifying the linkages between safety climate, safety knowledge, 
safety motivation, and safety behavior demonstrating that knowledge and motivation 
mediate the relationship between safety climate and self-reported safety compliance 
and participation. 
O’Toole (2002)  
 
Identifies safety culture as a critical factor that sets the tone for the importance of 
safety within an organisation. 
Mohamed (2002)  
 
Presents a model where safe work behaviors are consequences of existing safety 
climate in construction site environments. 
Maloney and 
Smith (2003)  
Presents two models i.e. modified behavior model and model of safety performance 
Mohamed (2003)  
 
Promotes adopting the balanced scorecard tool to benchmark organizational culture 
in construction and argues that selecting and evaluating measures in four 
perspectives: management, operational, customer, and learning, would enable 
organizations to pursue incremental safety performance improvements. 
Silva et al. (2004)  
 
Tests the reliability and validity of the OSCI (organization and safety climate 
inventory) questionnaire to address the characteristics of both organizational climate 
and safety climate within 15 industrial organisations. 
Richter and Koch 
(2004)  
Discusses perspective of integration, differentiation and ambiguity in safety culture. 
Reiman and 
Oedewald (2004)  
Presents a survey methodology for studying organizational culture in complex socio-
technical systems. 
Cooper and 
Phillips (2004) 
Determines the relationship between the measurements of the safety climate and 
safety behaviour. 
Fang et al. (2006)  
 
Identifies the dimensions of safety climate to improve the safety culture in 
construction. 
Source, Choudhry, Fang and Mohamed, 2007, pp. 997, 998. 
 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The challenge for the current project is to develop reliable, comparable and constant 
indicators that measure safety performance without the drawbacks commonly attributed to 
PPIs:  In other words, they must be easily measured and be able to be compared for 
benchmarking purposes within sections of an organization and across industries without 
being subject to random variation.  For the construction industry specifically, they must be 
able to be implemented uniformly from project site to project site notwithstanding the 
disparate sectors of the industry, the variability of the work undertaken and the diverse risk 
contexts these generate.  Further, they must be simple to implement so that they are not 
capital and human resource intensive:  They must not be so complex that they are time-
consuming to administer and collate and they must measure effectiveness instead of simply 
measuring a number of events which have no demonstrated effect on safety performance.    
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